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Abstract 
For Swedish newspaper firms, a market with high switching costs, the subscription
market, and a market with low switching costs, the advertising market, are of
approximately equal importance. When Sweden enters a deep recession, we find that
liquidity constraints influence the pricing decision in the former, but not the latter
market. This gives support to theories stressing the magnifying effect of liquidity
constraints on the business cycle.
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I. Introduction
Several hypotheses have been advanced to explain how price and margins vary over
the business cycle. In particular, economists have provided a number of models where
firms have the incentive to keep prices relatively low in times of high demand and
vice versa. Such behavior, if quantitatively important, would tend to amplify
economic fluctuations. These models can broadly be classified into three categories.
First, recessions are often accompanied by tight credit markets and liquidity
constraints for some firms. Liquidity constrained firms can, provided that consumers
have switching costs, boost short-run profits by increasing prices to avoid default at
the cost of foregone future profits; Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) and Gottfries
(1991). Second, in switching cost models, if periods of high demand are associated
with an inflow of new customers, not attached to a firm, firms will use aggressive
pricing behavior in order to capture them for the future; Bils (1989). Third, in implicit
collusion models firms gain more by deviating from fully collusive prices in high
demand states than in low. To sustain an implicitly collusive equilibrium, the prices in
high demand states must be lower than fully collusive prices; Rotemberg and Saloner
(1986). 
To test the mechanisms sketched above, we provide an empirical examination
of price adjustments in an industry that experienced dramatic changes in
macroeconomic conditions: the Swedish newspaper industry in 1990 to 1996. In
1990, Sweden entered a deep recession, with a falling real GDP for three consecutive
years, a quadrupling of unemployment, and a tightening of credits which caused a
threefold increase in bankruptcies. A strong recovery began in 1994 with three years
of high/medium-high GDP growth and a gradual loosening of credit. Such substantial
changes in macroeconomic conditions may, at a first approximation, affect all
newspapers to an equal extent. The question is if they all responded in a similar
manner. We test whether the patterns of price adjustments for subscriptions and
advertising space depended on firm specific factors, in particular the existence of
liquidity constraints, and market specific factors. Our data are especially well suited
for testing for effects of switching costs since newspapers set prices in two markets: 3
the subscription market, where switching costs are important, and the advertising
market, where buyers are less attached to a particular newspaper.
The most important result is that newspapers with weak financial standings
showed the highest increases in subscription price during the recession, which
improved their margins in the short run. Financial standings could not explain
differences in the price increases for advertising space, however. This suggests that
newspapers with liquidity constraints attempted to raise short-term profits by
exploiting readers' high switching costs, but could not improve their profitability at
the expense of advertisers. These results are fully in line with the predictions of
Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996). We find no support for the other two forces (inflow
of new customers and implicit collusion) behind counter cyclical margins. In the
recovery period none of the mechanisms had any significant impact on the pattern of
prices and margins.
II. Theories and Tests of Pricing over the Business Cycle
A priori, price-cost margins are expected to be pro-cyclical: in times of high demand,
margins are also high. However, it is conceivable that the mechanisms mentioned
above make margins counter-cyclical, or at least add a counter-cyclical component.
This possibility has spurred a significant empirical literature. Most of the early
empirical studies (e.g. Domowitz et al, 1988) employed aggregate inter-industry data
and found preciously little evidence of counter-cyclical tendencies. Rotemberg and
Woodford (1999) give references to more recent work in this vein. In this section, we
briefly discuss the theories of mark-ups over the business cycle and previous
empirical works that have relied on intra-industry data. We also discuss how the
theories can be tested with data from Swedish regional newspapers. 
Switching Costs and Liquidity Constraints
In the models of Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) and Gottfries (1991) consumers
incur a cost when changing supplier (see Klemperer, 1995, for a discussion of
switching costs). In the short run, switching costs will reduce the price sensitivity of a
firm's customers which, effectively, allows it to exploit captured customers by setting 4
a high price to raise profitability. Doing so, however, will induce consumers to search
for other alternatives, and customers once lost are costly to win back. When firms are
able to borrow against future profits they will not sacrifice long-run profits for short-
run gains, but liquidity constraints, for instance in a recession, increases the default
risk, which lowers the expected profits from investment in future market share.
In their empirical application, Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) used samples
of supermarkets in the U.S. to test their hypothesis that liquidity-constrained firms
tend to increase their prices (see also Chevalier, 1995). The evidence suggests that
firms likely to face liquidity constraints raised their prices relative to others, but the
difference is only a few percent. The results in Phillips (1995) also indicates that
financial constraints often lead to price increases. Borenstein and Rose (1995) report
evidence of the opposite in their study of airlines in (or close to) bankruptcy: these
firms lower their prices. Although Borenstein and Rose can not detect any effect on
rivals, Kennedy (2000) finds the adverse effects on the profits and sales that would be
expected if a competitor close to bankruptcy cut its prices.
There are some attractive features of the present data for a test of the
predictions on liquidity constraints in markets with switching costs. First, as noted in
the introduction, when Sweden entered a recession in 1990, credits were tightened as
a result of very large credit losses for all major banks. With accounting information
from newspaper firms, we can broadly categorize them as being more or less liquidity
constrained by their solvency (i.e. the ratio of own equity to total assets).
1 Firms with
low solvency are likely to be the ones most affected in the event of a tightening of
credit markets. Second, as the probability of default increases with time to the next
buyer-seller interaction, the time between interactions is of importance when
investing in customer stock. Newspaper subscriptions are usually renewed once a year
compared to the much more frequent interaction with e.g. supermarket customers.
Third, the revenue of a representative local newspaper roughly splits equally between
the sales of subscriptions and advertising space. We argue that the average buyer of
advertising space is much less attached to a particular newspaper than the average
                                                          
1 Studies of investment behavior have used profit margins, dividend payments and solvency to measure
the extent of liquidity constraints; for references see Hubbard (1998). Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996)
partly rely on variables relating to leveraged buy-outs to measure the importance of liquidity5
subscriber. This is motivated by the ease with which advertisers can change source in
response to a change in the cost of reaching consumers.
2 The reader, on the other
hand, has grown accustomed to a newspaper's content and style, and is therefore
unwilling to switch because of a modest increase in the subscription price. Using the
language of Klemperer (1995), the reader incurs a “psychological cost of switching”
induced by a change of preference in favor of the product previously chosen. The
importance of switching costs for daily newspapers is supported by empirical studies,
which usually find a highly inelastic relation between circulation and subscription
price in the short run for newspapers; see references quoted in Lewis (1995). 
Sales of subscriptions and advertising space are interrelated. As advertisers
have a preference for newspapers with a large circulation, increasing the subscription
price will involve a loss of advertising revenue.
3 However, as circulation is price
insensitive in the short-run, a subscription price increase may not force a reduction of
the price of advertising, which would imply a short-run increase in total revenue and
profits. This motivates our empirical specification, which treats the growth rate of the
subscription price as independent of the growth rate of the advertising price.
4
The prediction from the model of Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) is that
firms with the lowest solvency (as of 1989) should have the highest price increases
for subscriptions in the 1990-1992 recession. It is not immediately clear that any
prediction can be made for the 1994-1996 recovery. First, as the general economic
conditions improved during this period, it gradually became easier to obtain new
credits even for firms with low solvency. Second, it may be too costly for newspapers
that have lost subscribers in a recession to win some back by lowering their prices. In
both periods, prices for advertising space should be essentially independent of the
financial position.
                                                                                                                                                                     
constraints. However, there is an issue whether LBO firms is a valid test group as a change in
ownership may lead to substantial changes in firm strategy, not directly related to liquidity constraints. 
2 Advertisers in national newspapers and on TV, usually producers of branded consumer products and
large retail chains, are likely to have more long-term relationships that are costly to terminate, for
instance due to quantity discounts. However, the advertising content of local newspapers is dominated
by occasional promotions by local businesses, which suggests a reliance on short-term contracts.
3 There is mixed evidence on the relation between subscription price and advertising sales. Thompson
(1989) and Dertouzos and Trautman (1990), among others, have estimated systems of equations for
cross section data. Dertouzos and Trautman used a cross-section of U.S. newspapers and found some
effects of subscription price on sales of advertising, with a price elasticity of -0.45. On the other hand,
Thompson fails to find a clear price-quantity relationship for either subscription or advertising price
with British and Irish data.6
Customer Flows
The demand functions might be more elastic during booms such that prices should be
kept relatively low. One reason for this is that high demand states are associated with
an inflow of consumers who have not previously bought the product. If these develop
switching costs after their initial purchase then firms would lower their prices in high
demand states in order to capture these new consumers for future exploitation; see
Bils (1989). However, the argument rests on the assumption that the demand increase
stems from an inflow of new customers rather than higher demand from repeat
purchasers (which would lead to higher prices). 
Our data allows us to discriminate between high demand per consumer and a
large inflow of new consumers. Although an upturn in the economy affects the
demand per consumer in all local markets, certain areas will benefit relatively more.
We measure this variation at the market level by the growth rate in the average per
capita disposable income. To measure the importance of an inflow of consumers we
use statistics on migration patterns within the country. From this hypothesis, we
expect to find lower subscription price increases in markets with a high inflow of
consumers, measured as a percentage of the population. For the advertising market,
on the other hand, large inflows would lead to higher demand for advertising from
local business and would be more likely to raise than to lower advertising prices. 
Implicit Collusion and Market Structure
It is often claimed that the intensity of competition varies with demand conditions and
that firms have difficulties in sustaining implicitly collusive agreements when demand
is unstable. Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) formalized the intuition in a model where
demand fluctuates randomly between high and low states, but where firms can
observe the realization of demand. The key intuition behind their result that price-cost
margins may have a counter-cyclical tendency is that firms have a greater incentive to
deviate when the value of future collusive profits is low, compared to the value of a
current deviation. With no correlation in demand, it may be impossible to sustain fully
collusive prices in periods with high demand. The issue of the temporal dependence
                                                                                                                                                                     
4 In our data, the correlation between the growth rates of the annual subscription price and price for7
of demand shocks has been addressed in several extensions of the model. Bagwell and
Staiger (1997) consider the effects of randomness in the growth rates in demand (see
Haltiwanger and Harrington, 1991, and Kandori, 1991, for other types of demand
fluctuations). Under the empirically plausible assumption of positive correlation of
growth rates in demand, Bagwell and Staiger show that price-cost margins tend to be
pro-cyclical rather than counter-cyclical. Another situation, where firms cannot
observe the state of demand, is modeled in Green and Porter (1984). This might lead
to an equilibrium with temporal punishments following a low demand state, which
could be observed as a pro-cyclical tendency of price-cost margins. 
A number of studies have attempted to test predictions from the models of
implicit collusion. One of the most comprehensive studies to date is Ellison's (1994)
structural model of supply and demand in a railway shipping cartel in the 1880's,
designed to test predictions from competing models of implicit collusion. He finds
little in terms of support for the mechanism in Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) but
some evidence in favor of that in Green and Porter (1984). Borenstein and Shepard
(1996) study the dynamics of prices and margins in regional retail gasoline markets in
the U.S., using the fact that demand fluctuates over the year and that there is a
delayed pass-through of some cost components. They find that predictable increases
in future demand (cost) tend to increase (decrease) price-cost margins, which is
consistent with models suggesting that implicitly collusive agreements are more
difficult to sustain when the gains from deviation are large.
The bottom line is that the theories of implicit collusion are sensitive to the
fine details of the game. While it is possible in some cases to explicitly model the
game, it is more common, as is done here, to test whether prices move in the direction
predicted by some model in response to changes in demand. The most robust
prediction of models based on implicit collusion is that the pattern of price
adjustments should vary with the market structure, in the sense that monopoly firms
do not need to take strategic interaction into account.
5 The data contains a number of
                                                                                                                                                                     
advertising space is 0.15 and 0.01 for the 1990-1992 and 1994-1996 period, respectively. 
5 Prices and margins might only gradually adjust to new conditions and it is possible that the speed of
the adjustment process depends on the market structure. Fisher and Konienczny (1995) find that
monopoly newspapers adjust their prices more frequently, and by smaller nominal amounts than
newspapers with one competitor. However, Thompson (1988) found no evidence of market structure
or circulation being important determinants of the speed of adjustment of advertising prices. While it is
conceivable that our market structure dummy also picks up differences in the speed of adjustment, we8
newspapers that can be considered as monopolies, and there are also instances where
a local newspaper has a very high market share and only faces weak competition from
other local and/or national newspapers. Other markets are characterized by close
competition between two newspapers. In the regressions, we use a dummy variable
for whether the market is a monopoly or duopoly to capture the possibility that the
intensity of competition varies with the state of demand.
III. Data
The Swedish daily newspaper industry is well documented. Advertisers have an
interest in knowing the circulation and geographical coverage of newspapers as well
as prices for advertising. This information has been provided by the Swedish audit
bureau of circulation, Tidningsstatistik AB. The Swedish association for newspaper
publishers, Tidningsutgivarna, collects information on subscription rates. The
government subsidizes some newspapers and its agency, Presstödsnämnden, monitors
the publishers' economic performance. In addition to these sources, we employ census
data from Statistics Sweden (Statistiska Centralbyrån). The full data set contains
information on all (133, as of 1992) newspapers in Sweden over the period 1975-
1996. Our analysis, covering the turbulent period 1990-1996, is restricted to local
morning newspapers with three or more issues per week, which gives a sample of
approximately 90 newspapers in each of the years.
6 The time dimension is limited, as
balance sheet variables, used to measure liquidity constraints, are only recorded from
1989 to 1996.
The Swedish Economy over the Sample Period
Most of the changes in demand and cost conditions, such as wages, interest rates,
paper costs and general inflation, are the same, irrespective of the local market in
                                                                                                                                                                     
believe the two-year intervals we use to be sufficiently long for prices to be fully adjusted to new
conditions.
6 We have excluded four evening newspapers, sold almost exclusively as single copies, since these
only compete with local morning newspapers to a minor extent. The second group excluded is morning
newspapers with coverage in a very large number of local markets. This group includes three large
national morning newspapers, and two newspapers tied to religious and political organizations, which
cover most of the country but have very low local market shares. Finally, we do not consider 37
newspapers with only one or two issues per week, read as a local or political additive to a regular
newspaper and viewed as distinctly different by government agencies and people involved in the
industry. The exact numbers vary slightly over the years, the numbers above are for 1992.9
which the newspaper operates. We do not account for the effects of changes in such
general conditions, as our analysis is aimed at explaining differences across
newspapers. In the years prior to our sample period, GDP growth rates were high and
unemployment low, as shown in Figure 1. The beginning of the 1990’s saw a very
severe recession, with real GDP falling for three consecutive years (1991-1993) and a
dramatic increase in unemployment. Tightening of firm credits was a prominent
feature of the recession. All major banks suffered considerable credit losses, in total 5
percent of GDP in 1992, and had a large ex ante probability of bankruptcy. Indeed,
the government had to intervene to save a number of banks from collapse. In the
economy, the total number of firm bankruptcies almost tripled from 1989 to 1992.
This recession was followed by a recovery, although unemployment remained at a
high level. Naturally, there is some ambiguity as to when exactly the recession ended
and the recovery began and we therefore split the sample into two sub-periods: 1990-
1992 and 1994-1996. 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Market Data 
Our definition of a market follows the standard Swedish municipal classification. We
define a newspaper’s home market as the municipality where it has its largest
circulation.
7 The median newspaper has 62 percent of the total circulation in its home
market. A newspaper’s market level data includes demographic and income statistics
from its home market. As the circulation is concentrated to the home market, we do
not try to incorporate the economic development in other municipalities where a
newspaper is sold. The development in these, almost always neighboring, markets is
also likely to be highly correlated with the home market. In the regressions we use the
growth rate in disposable income per capita over the periods, denoted INCGROWTH.
According to customer market theories, e.g. Bils (1989), a change in the number of
new consumers will cause a change in prices. We capture this with the difference in
the ratio of immigration to total population, IMMIGDIFF.
                                                          
7 In one case only does the municipality where a firm has it its largest circulation change. Since this
newspaper has roughly the same circulation in the two municipalities, we let its home market remain
the same over the sample period. 10
Newspaper Data
To measure the development of nominal prices during the two periods, we use the
annual subscription price and the price per millimeter for ads with non-specified
placement, as of January 1.
8 Although newspapers offer a large menu of advertising
possibilities depending on the size and place of the ad, and often also sells
subscriptions of different duration, these are the prices on which people in the
industry usually rely in their comparisons. The dependent variables are the growth
rates of the two nominal prices PSUBGROWTH and PADVGROWTH, defined as
100×(P[t]-P[t-2])/ P[t-2]. We do not deflate the two prices, as general inflation is the
same for all newspapers. The data also includes information from the income
statement and some balance sheet variables such as own equity and total debt. Certain
owners control several local newspapers but for the vast majority, accounting data are
broken down per newspaper.
9 In the cases where no separate figures exist, we assume
the accounting variables to be the same for all newspapers in the same firm. The
income statement gives our next dependent variable, the change in price-cost margin,
MARGDIFF, defined as 100×(PMC[t]-PMC[t-2]), where PMC is total revenues
(including government subsidies) minus total costs, divided by total revenues. This
measure is admittedly crude and is also the same for newspapers in the same firm, but
it can give an indication of whether a newspaper's short-run performance improved or
deteriorated during a certain period. 
We are interested in whether a newspaper's behavior depends on its market
position. As noted above, some municipalities are the home market for only one local
newspaper, while others have two local newspapers. There are no municipalities with
more than two local newspapers with three or more issues per week. If there is no
competing local newspaper, the newspaper is referred to as a monopoly and the
dummy variable MONOPOLY  takes on the value one.  In most of the monopoly
                                                          
8  Subscription rates often remain unchanged for periods up to a year, potentially leading to a
measurement problem in the dependent variable. However, most newspapers adjust prices in January
such that this problem is likely to be of minor importance. Advertising rates are adjusted more
frequently. 
9 As of 1994, one owner owned nine local newspapers, one owned seven, one owned five, two owned
four and three owned three. In some cases, all newspapers are within the same firm, in other cases
there are several separate firms. Matching the accounting data with circulations and subscription prices
suggests that the major part of the firms’ revenue stems from the industry, i.e. they seem to have very
limited exposure to activities in other industries.11
markets there are other (non-local) newspapers with a household coverage of more
than three percent. However, as the home market accounts for 62 percent of the total
circulation for the median newspaper we expect little strategic interaction between a
local and a non-local newspaper. Monopoly markets tend to be small in terms of
population and, consequently, monopoly newspapers have a low total circulation. The
competitive situation for newspapers with one local competitor may differ depending
on their relative market shares, but no attempt is made here to make a finer distinction
between newspapers in this category.
10 
As the theory predicts that liquidity constraints should only play a role for
newspapers facing a bankruptcy risk we use a dummy variable, LOWSOLVENCY,
defined as a solvency below 15 percent.
11 The reason for not using a continuous
variable is that for a firm with high solvency the bankruptcy risk is negligible.
Solvency is measured one year prior to the period in question, which might be treated
as exogenous since the recession was unexpected
12. For newspapers with one local
competitor there might be interaction in the pricing decisions. For instance, if a
liquidity constrained newspaper raises its subscription price, this may also give its
rival the opportunity to raise price. This is captured by the variable
RIVAL_LOWSOLVENCY, which takes the value one if the newspaper competes in the
same market as a newspaper with solvency below 15 percent.
Bankrupt newspapers may face different demand conditions due to consumer
uncertainty regarding future publication and quality of the newspaper. The dummy
variable BANKRUPT denotes four newspapers, all with the same owner and having
                                                          
10 We have, however, tried to assign a dummy variable to each newspaper according to its position in
the home market. There is considerable heterogeneity among newspapers in the duopoly markets.
Some duopoly markets have two newspapers with roughly the same coverage. Furthermore, there are
asymmetric duopoly markets where one of the newspapers has significantly larger coverage.
Preliminary regressions showed no evidence of differences in the pricing pattern between different
types of duopoly newspapers.
11 As mentioned above, several newspapers may have the same owner. In one case, the owner, Nya
Wermlandstidningen, owns a subsidiary whose solvency was low in 1989, and eight subsidiaries with
high solvency in that year. We treat all newspapers with this owner as having high solvency. This is
motivated by our intention to let low solvency be a measure of bankruptcy risk. If the owner has a
strong financial position it could, if needed, make a capital infusion to save a subsidiary from
bankruptcy. 
12 Income from advertising is affected by business cycle fluctuations to a much larger extent than
income from subscriptions. If the share of income from advertising was correlated with low solvency it
would be unclear whether LOWSOLVENCY picks up the effects of liquidity constraints or some other
effect of vulnerability to the business cycle. This is not the case however, as the share of income from
advertising is about the same size for the two groups of firms, 0.50 for low solvency firms and 0.52 for
other firms. If subsidies are included as a part of the income, the figures change to 0.45 and 0.51, as
low solvency firms are over-represented among the small duopoly firms.12
low solvency in 1989, that were bankrupt in 1992. They are still published in 1992
and quote prices for this year, but as no accounting data are available they are missing
in the MARGDIFF regression. These newspapers were reconstructed in 1993, but had
a significantly lower circulation in the 1994-1996 period. Analogous with the
argument above, we use RIVAL_BANKRUPT to capture the possibility that the
behavior may change for a newspaper that competes with bankrupt rival. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
As seen in Table 1, the sample contains 19 newspapers whose solvency was
below 15 percent in 1989, four of which were bankrupt in 1992. If the cutoff level had
been 10 (20) percent solvency, 14 (27) newspapers would have been in the category.
Low solvency newspapers are relatively less common among the monopolies (7/53
compared to 12/34 among the duopolies) but they do not stand out in terms of size. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Table 2 reveals that the average increases in the nominal price were higher in
the first than in the second period, both in the subscription and the advertising market.
Margins improved, on average, by 2.5 percent in the recession and declined by 5.5
percent in the recovery.
13 In the first period, it is striking that those that eventually go
bankrupt have much smaller price increases, 14 percentage points, than the average
22 percentage points. The other newspapers with low solvency in 1989 exhibit
subscription price increases that are three percentage points higher than the average,
but advertising price increases that are close to the average. A mirror image is that the
group with low solvency managed to increase their margins by 4.8 percentage points,
or 2.2 percentage points more than the sample average. For the recovery period, price
changes are similar across groups of newspapers of different characteristics although
margins fell by more for the monopoly group. 
                                                          
13 The differences in averages across periods can partly be attributed to growth in CPI and input costs.
Growth in CPI, measured as of January, was 16 percent between 1990 and 1992, and 4 percent
between 1994 and 1996. Hence, real prices increased by roughly 6 percentage points in each of the
periods. In the two periods, journalist wages increased by 7 and 3 percent, and the newsprint price
declined by 5 percent in the recession and increased by 26 percent in the recovery. The improvements13
A maintained assumption in the analysis is that readers have switching costs
and that circulation is relatively insensitive to price in the short run, such that it is
possible to, temporarily, improve margins. Although our data is insufficient to
estimate demand functions for the newspapers (we lack measures of their quality) it is
still possible to use information about circulation to provide some evidence to support
the claim. During the recession, subscription prices rose on average by 22 percent
nominally and 6 percent in real terms, while average circulation fell only by 1.5
percent. The correlation coefficient for growth in the subscription price and the
change in circulation was -0.28. In the same period, the correlation between the
change in margins and the growth in subscription price was 0.34. Together, this
suggests that price sensitivity was indeed low, and that the newspapers increasing
their subscription prices the most, were able to improve their margins substantially. 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Table 3 gives the means and standard deviations of the independent variables.
Most importantly, we see that there is very little variation in INCGROWTH  and
IMMIGDIFF. The fraction of firms categorized as MONOPOLY has risen from 60.3
percent in 1992 to 64.4 percent in 1996, due to the exit of three duopoly newspapers.
IV. Results
We use separate, reduced form specifications with PSUBGROWTH, PADVGROWTH,
and MARGDIFF as dependent variables.
14 The results for the two periods, ending in
1992 and 1996 respectively, are shown in Table 4.
15 Examining the adjusted R-square
in the different regressions reveal that the included variables can help explain the
development of prices and margins in the 1990-1992 recession but not in the 1994-
                                                                                                                                                                     
in margins in the recession and the decline in the recovery thus, to some extent seem to be caused by
the movements in newsprint price. 
14  The correlation between the error terms in the subscription price and the advertising price
regressions are 0.02 and 0.05 in the 1990-1992 and the 1994-1996 periods, respectively. This supports
our specification that treats the rates of price changes in the two markets as unrelated.
15 The difference in the number of observations in Table 4 is due to missing accounting data for the
firms for 1992; hence it is not possible to compute the margin. In four cases, the lack of accounting
data is due to bankruptcy. For the period 1994-1996, the difference in number of observations is due to
missing accounting information for one newspaper.14
1996 recovery. This might be attributed to the fact that the recovery is less
pronounced (e.g. unemployment remained at high levels) than the recession.
However, the pattern is not inconsistent with predictions from the model of Chevalier
and Scharfstein (1996). Although liquidity constrained firms deplete their customer
stock by raising prices in the recession, when credit conditions ease in the recovery
they may not find it profitable to reduce prices in an attempt to regain market share.
In the following, we will focus our discussion to the first period.
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Switching Costs and Liquidity Constraint
Newspapers with low solvency raised their subscription prices 3.6 percentage points
(or 17 percent) and their margins increased by 2.5 percentage points more than others
did.
16 In the advertising market there is no significant difference between the groups
and thus the sharp improvement in margins should be attributed to the higher
subscription prices. Together this is evidence that firms with a high default risk can,
and do, exploit their customer base to raise short-run profits. This, in turn, leads to
softer competition: newspapers with liquidity constrained rivals also exhibit
significantly larger increases in subscription prices. The main results from the three
regressions on the 1990-1992 data support the model of Chevalier and Scharfstein
(1996).
The newspapers that went bankrupt in 1992 had much smaller price increases
than the average.
17 There may be two explanations to this finding. First, if it becomes
clear to readers that a newspaper will inevitably become bankrupt in the near future,
then the demand for subscriptions will drop. In order to keep its circulation, the 
                                                          
16 Using 10 percent as the cutoff level for LOWSOLVENCY changes the estimates for LOWSOLVENCY
to 2.48**(1.26) and 2.20(1.68) and for RIVAL_LOWSOLVENCY to 1.47(2.39) and 2.96*(1.80), in
Table 4, columns (1) and (3), respectively.
Using 20 percent as the cutoff level changes the estimates for LOWSOLVENCY to 3.00** (1.20) and
2.05 (1.37) and for RIVAL_LOWSOLVENCY to 2.53 (1.93) and 3.50*(1.88), in Table 4, column (1)
and (3) respectively. Estimates for 1994-1996 are essentially unchanged.
17 There is only minor changes on estimates in the regression for subscription price changes for 1990-
1992 if bankrupt newspapers are excluded; the point estimate for LOWSOLVENCY changes to
3.63***(1.29). For the advertising price regression for 1990-1992, adjusted R-square almost falls to
zero, which is not surprising since BANKRUPT is the only significant variable in that regression.15
newspaper may be forced to lower its subscription prices. Second, these firms may
have gone bankrupt just because they did not raise prices sufficiently. A closer
examination of price changes for the periods 1990-1991 and 1991-1992 suggest that it
is in the latter that the bankrupt newspapers behave differently. Between January 1
1991 and January 1 1992, the bankrupt newspapers increased their subscription prices
by only 3.6 percent compared to 10.7 for the sample average, and 12.6 for those with
low solvency that avoided bankruptcy. In the year before, there were no marked
differences between the pricing behavior of different types of newspapers. For the full
sample, circulation fell by on average one percent in both 1990-1991 and 1991-1992.
The circulation for the newspapers that went bankrupt in 1992 fell by 14 percent and
15 percent in each of the two years, respectively. Taken together, this indicates that
readers may have realized already in 1990-1991 that some newspapers would not
survive, and that these were therefore forced to limit price increases in 1991-1992. 
Customers Flows
Markets with large inflows of new consumers should exhibit lower prices (Bils, 1989)
and a change in inflows will then cause a change in the price. The econometric results
in Table 4 show no support for this and neither did further testing on other years
between 1975 and 1996. The reason can be that new subscribers are targeted with
discounted introductory offers, making it unnecessary to cut the regular price to
capture the (relatively few) new subscribers. This is supported by our companion
paper, Asplund et al (2001), where we show that the fraction of circulation sold at a
discount (usually between 3 and 10 percent) is slightly higher in areas with large
inward migration. Contrary to our expectations, the estimated coefficient on
INCGROWTH is negative in the MARGDIFF regression. The likely reason is that
small local differences in the economic conditions make it difficult to trace any effect.
Implicit Collusion and Market Structure
We find no significant differences in either subscription price or advertising price, or
in price cost margins, between firms facing competition and monopolies in any of our
regressions. For subscription prices these findings are not surprising, as any
newspaper can rapidly detect the moves of its rivals, which is contrary to a basic16
assumption in the model. Whether the same is true for advertising prices is unclear.
The prices in our data are list prices per millimeter of non-specified placement, but
the possibility remains that some large advertisers get secret discounts. According to
people in the industry, this is quite common for the period studied. 
V. Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined the behavior of prices and margins in the Swedish
newspaper industry during a sharp economic downturn and a following recovery. The
purpose was to evaluate some mechanisms that could lead to a countercyclical
tendency of prices and margins. In particular, we focused on the effects of liquidity
constraints in a recession that more than tripled the number of bankruptcies in the
economy. 
We find that newspapers with low solvency at the beginning of the recession
increased their subscription prices and that their margins improved, relative to other
newspapers. Our interpretation, consistent with the prediction from Chevalier and
Scharfstein (1996), is that their low solvency implied a bankruptcy risk, which could
only be avoided by exploiting readers whose switching costs were high. In the same
period, increases in advertising prices did not depend on financial strength. The
reason is that buyers of advertising space are not tied to the same extent to a particular
supplier and may switch in response to a price increase. Our use of the advertising
market as a control strengthens the idea that it is the presence of switching costs that
explain the relative increase in subscription price for the liquidity constrained firms in
the downturn. In the recovery, when credit conditions gradually eased, measures of
solvency could not explain any of the variation in pricing behavior. We also examined
whether pricing patterns differed between monopoly newspapers and duopoly
newspapers, as might be expected if the possibility to sustain implicitly collusive
agreements depends on the state of demand, see e.g. Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986,
and Green and Porter, 1984. However, we find no evidence for this hypothesis.
Neither were the pricing pattern dependent on regional differences in migratory
patterns and income growth, as suggested by models along the lines of Bils (1989). 17
References
Asplund, Marcus, Eriksson, Rickard and Niklas Strand, (2001), ‘Price Discrimination
in Oligopoly: Evidence from Swedish Newspapers’, Working Paper Series in
Economics and Finance no. 468, Stockholm School of Economics.
Bagwell, K. and Staiger, R. W., 1997, ‘Collusion over the Business Cycle’, RAND
Journal of Economics, 28, pp. 82-106.
Bils, M., 1989, ‘Pricing in a Customer Market’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104,
pp. 699-718.
Borenstein, S. and Rose, N., 1995, ‘Bankruptcy and Pricing Behaviour in U.S. Airline
Markets’, American Economic Review, 85, pp. 397-402.
Borenstein, S. and Shepard, A. 1996, ‘Dynamic Pricing in Retail Gasoline Markets’,
RAND Journal of Economics, 27, pp. 429-51. 
Chevalier, J., 1995, ‘Capital Structure and Product-Market Competition: Empirical
Evidence from the Supermarket Industry’, American Economic Review, 85, pp.
415-35.
Chevalier, J. and Scharfstein, D., 1996, ‘Capital-Market Imperfections and
Countercyclical Markups: Theory and Evidence’, American Economic Review,
86(4), pp. 703-725.
Dertouzos, J. N. and Trautman, W. B., 1990, ‘Economic Effects of Media
Concentration: Estimates from a Model of the Newspaper Firm’, The Journal of
Industrial Economics, 39, pp. 1-14.
Domowitz, I., R., Hubbard, G. and Petersen, B. C., 1988, ‘Market Structure and
Cyclical Fluctuations in U.S. Manufacturing’, Review of Economics and
Statistics, 70,  pp. 55-66.
Ellison, G., 1994, ‘Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee’,
RAND Journal of Economics, 25, pp. 37-57.
Fisher, T. C. G. and Konieczny, J. D., 1995, ‘The Relative Rigidity of Oligopoly
Pricing’, Economics Letters, 49, pp. 33-38.
Gottfries, N., 1991, ‘Customer Markets, Credit Market Imperfections and Real Price
Rigidity’, Economica, 58, pp. 317-23.
Green, E. J. and Porter, R. H., 1984, ‘Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price
Information’, Econometrica, 52, pp. 87-100.
Haltiwanger, J. and Harrington Jr, J. E., 1991, The Impact of Cyclical Demand
Movements on Collusive Behavior, RAND Journal of Economics, 22, pp. 89-
106.
Hubbard, R. G., 1998, ‘Capital-Market Imperfections and Investment’, Journal of
Economic Literature, 36, pp. 193-225.
Kandori, M., 1991, ‘Correlated Demand Shocks and Price Wars during Booms’,
Review of Economic Studies, 58, pp. 171-80.
Kennedy, R. E., 2000, ‘The Effect of Bankruptcy Filings on Rivals’ Operating
Performance: Evidence from 51 Large Bankruptcies’, International Journal of
the Economics of Business, 7, pp. 5-25.
Klemperer, P., 1995, ‘Competition When Consumers Have Switching Costs: An
Overview with Applications to Industrial Organization, Macroeconomics, and
International Trade’, Review of Economic Studies, 62, pp. 515-39.
Lewis, R., 1995, ‘Relation between Newspaper Subscription Price and Circulation,
1971-1992’, Journal of Media Economics, 8, pp. 25-41.
Phillips, G. M., 1995, ‘Increased Debt and Industry Product Markets: An Empirical
Analysis’, Journal of Financial Economics, 37, pp. 189-238.18
Rotemberg, J. J. and Saloner, G., 1986, ‘A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars
during Booms’, American Economic Review, 76, pp. 390-407.
Rotemberg, J. J. and Woodford, , M., 1999, ‘The Cyclical Behavior of Prices and
Costs’, in Taylor, J. B., and Woodford, M. (eds), Handbook of
Macroeconomics, Vol.1B, (Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.).
Thompson, R. S., 1988, ‘Price Adjustment and Market Structure, a Single Industry
Study’, Managerial and Decision Economics, 9, pp. 87-92.
Thompson, R. S., 1989, ‘Circulation versus Advertiser Appeal in the Newspapers
Industry: An Empirical Investigation’, Journal of Industrial Economics, 37, pp.
259-271.19




















19 19 2 0 0 27500
(20300)
     BANKRUPT=1 4 4 0 4 0 13000
(4400)




68 0 9 0 5 26700
(20500)
MONOPOLY=1 53 7 0 0 0 20400
(15200)
MONOPOLY=0 34 12 11 4 5 39100
(48200)
Standard deviations in parenthesis.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics by firm type as of 1992, regression samples
PSUBGROWTH PADVGROWTH MARGDIFF











































































Standard deviations in parenthesis.20
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics, Independent Variables,


























Standard deviations in parenthesis.Table 4. Regression Results, Price Changes and Changes in Margins 1990-92 and 1994-96
1990-92 1994-96
Variable PSUBGROWTH PADVGROWTH MARGDIFF PSUBGROWTH PADVGROWTH MARGDIFF
CONSTANT    27.2***
(7.68)




   3.31**
(1.49)










































































Adjusted R-squared 0.168 0.117 0.069 -0.011 -0.007 0.006
Number of observations 87 87 81 87 87 86
Standard errors, using White's robust covariance matrix, in parenthesis. 

































































GDP growth Unemployment Bankruptcies Advertisement